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IN THE SUPREME COURT
OF THE STATE OF UTAH
L Y R A D M c C O N K I E and
\
I L E N E M c C O N K I E , his wife,
Plaintiffs and Appellants, I
VS

I Case N o .
f 13614

'

F L O I D C. H A R T M A N and
I
R U T H A. H A R T M A N , his wife,
Defendants and Respondents, j

Brief of Defendants-Respondents

N A T U R E OF T H E CASE
Plaintiffs complained on November 30, 1972, (R1) that a deed which defendants delivered and which
plaintiffs caused to be recorded on February 26, 1964,
(R. 8) contained a reservation of mineral interests which
was not within a uniform real estate contract dated November 1,1960. Plaintiffs prayed for reformation of the
deed, decree of quiet title and specific performance of
the contract based upon fraud.
1
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Defendants alleged latches and the applicable statutes of limitations for actions upon oral and written
contracts and for actions based upon fraud. They contended that the agreements prior to the conveyance
merged into the deed and that the deed with the reservation was according to the contemplated agreement between the parties. (R. 38-52)

DISPOSITION IN L O W E R COURT
The District Court for Duchesne County with the
Honorable J . Robert Bullock presiding heard the evidence and arguments of counsel at trial of this matter
and entered findings of fact and conclusions of law
upon which judgment for defendants was entered. (R.
79-87)
R E L I E F S O U G H T ON A P P E A L
Defendants seek affirmation of the judgment of
the District Court based upon its findings or based upon
the contentions urged by defendants to the trial court
that all prior agreements of the parties merged into the
deeds delivered to plaintiffs or the deeds expressed the
contemplated agreement between the parties.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiffs' brief contains inaccurate statements
of fact. They are contrary to the record and contrary to
2
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the trial court's findings of fact (R. 79-87) which are
presumed correct.
Preliminarily, the subject matter of this suit is not
the real property described in Exhibits 2 and 3. I t is
only that real property described in Exhibit 2. The only
warranty deed the plaintiffs sought to reform by their
complaint (R. 1-8) and amended complaint (R. 15-18)
was plaintiffs' Exhibit 2 (R. 8, 448-450). Plaintiffs had
no interest in the real property described in Exhibit 3.
Plaintiffs conveyed the real property they had received
by Exhibit 3 from defendants to a Mr. Roy Warren on
February 13, 1967. Plaintiffs conveyed that property to
Warren by defendants' Exhibit 12 (R. 52-55, 84). Interestingly, Mr. McConkie claimed he intended a reservation of the mineral interests in that real property
when he conveyed to Mr. Warren but failed to write a
reservation in the deed which is Exhibit 12 (R. 357359). In other words, throughout this action the plaintiffs claim a reservation of mineral interests unto themselves when there was no written reservation and denied
the validity of the written reservations in the deeds the
defendants delivered to them, Exhibits 2 and 3. (R.
357-359)
The defendants additionally correct and expand
upon plaintiffs' statement of facts in further support of
the trial court's findings of fact and in support of the
trial court's ruling in denying defendants' motion to dismiss "pro forma" and ordering that defendants did not
waive any rights if defendants proceeded to produce
3
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evidence (R. 400). In connection with that ruling the
trial court said:
" I don't think you've shown any fraud."
. . . I don't think there would be any factual basis
that the court could find any fraud upon the part
of any party to this action. (R. 396)."
On March 19, 1959, the defendants as sellers and
Arthello Clark and his wife and Richard Titensor and
his wife as purchasers entered into a uniform real estate
contract which is Defendants' Exhibit No. 6. The Clarks
and Titensors took possession of 292 acres of real property near Altamont, Duchesne County, Utah under that
contract which was defendants' farm. Although 80 acres
of defendants' farm was omitted from the legal description in the contract, the plaintiffs believed the 80 acres
was included (R. 364-365, 378-380). Mr. McConkie had
known the defendants for approximately 35 years (R.
314-315). H e was familiar with defendants' farm and
knew the Clarks and Titensors had possession of all 292
acres of defendants' farm under the contract of sale (R.
321-328). Defendants admitted the 80 acres had been
omitted from the legal description by inadvertence (R.
410). There was no reservation of mineral interests in
the March 19, 1959, contract (Ex. D-6).
Ten days later on March 29, 1959, the defendants
and the Clarks and Titensors entered into an escrow
agreement with First Security Bank of Utah as escrow
(R. 410). The March 19, 1959 contract, the March 29,
1959, escrow agreement and two warranty deeds dated
March 29, 1959, were deposited with the bank as escrow
4
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(Ex. D-7). The contract, escrow agreement and two
warranty deeds did not contain a legal description of the
80 acres. Apparently, the omission in the original contract of March 19, 1959, caused the omissions of the 80
acres in the subsequent documents of escrow and conveyance. However, the two warranty deeds with the defendants as grantors and the Clarks and Titensors as
grantees that were placed in the escrow file on March
29, 1959, contained reservations of mineral interests.
(Ex. D-7) The warranty deed for the real property in
Section 1 reserved unto the defendants three-fourths of
all the oil, gas and mineral rights. The deed for the real
property in Section 32 contained a reservation unto the
defendants of one-fourth of all the oil, gas and mineral
rights. (Ex. D-7) Curiously, a line had been drawn
through those deeds in the escrow's file, (Ex. D-7).
Sometime in September, 1960, the plaintiffs became interested in taking an assignment of the Clarks'
and Titensors' purchasers' interest in the March 19,
1959, contract, (Ex. D-6). Plaintiffs negotiated with
the Clarks and conferred with the escrow, First Security Bank (R. 323-325, 364-366). The defendant, Mr.
McConkie, had previous experience in purchasing real
estate with First Security Bank as escrow of real estate
contracts (R. 332-334). H e knew deeds held in escrow
would be delivered by the escrow to him or to the County Recorder who would mail the deeds to him (R. 333334).
On October 31, 1960, the Clarks and Titensors assigned their interest in the March 19, 1959, contract to

5
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the plaintiffs (R. 328-332, 336, 364-366). That written
assignment is defendants' Exhibit D-5. I t was deposited
with the escrow and filed in Exhibit 7.
On November 1, 1970, there was a meeting at the
bank's or escrow's offices (R. 332). The March 19,
1959, contract had to be amended to reflect the settlement of a lawsuit between the parties to that contract
(R. 437). As a result of their settlement of claims and
counterclaims the provisions for personal property, for
real property defendants had received from the Clarks
and Titensors as part of the purchase price, for the balance owing on the contract, for the terms of payment
and for the interest on mortgages of the sellers' interest
had to be amended (R. 410-414, 420-423, 429-432, 437).
Furthermore, the defendants wanted to correct the
omission of the 80 acres from the description and they
wanted a statement of their mortgage to Equitable Life
included (R. 377-380). Naturally, the asignee of the
March 19, 1959, contract had to approve the amendments which they did and plaintiffs and defendants
signed a uniform real estate contract form prepared by
one of the officers of First Security Bank of Utah to
reflect the amendments. That document is Plaintiffs'
Exhibit 1 which is dated November 1, 1960, (R. 378380, 408-414, 420-423, 429-432, 437).
After plaintiffs became assignees of the Clarks' and
Titensors' interest in the property they made payments
to the escrow, First Security Bank, as assignees and according to the amended contract for three years (R.
338). The escrow's file contained the March 19, 1959,
6
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contract, the two warranty deeds to the Clarks and
Titensors with reservations of Mineral interests, the assignment dated October 31, I960, and the November 1,
1960, amendment to the March 19, 1959, contract (Ex.
P . 7). There was not another escrow agreement executed when plaintiffs and defendants deposited the November 1, 1960, amendment (Ex. P - l ) with First Security Bank as escrow but subsequently the plaintiff,
Mr. McConkie, signed a release of escrow on February
26,1964, (Ex. D-14) as assignee of the March 19, 1959,
contract between defendants and the Clarks and Titensors (R. 381, 336-338). That release of escrow (Ex.
D-14) signed by Mr. McConkie was deposited in the
escrow file (Ex. D-7; R. 402-403).
On or about December 8, 1960, the defendants
realized they had not deposited warranty deeds with the
escrow to replace the deeds with the Clarks and Titensors as grantees which contained reservations of mineral
interests. They contemplated that the plaintiffs stood in
the shoes of the Clarks and Titensors as their assignees.
A reservation of mineral interests was always contemplated between the defendants and the Clarks and
Titensors. Defendants thought that a reservation in the
deeds on deposit with the escrow expressed that contemplation and that it was unnecessary to express it
otherwise. Therefore, they instructed their attorney,
Mr. George Stewart, to draft two warranty deeds to
replace the warranty deeds on deposit. The only changes
they requested in the warranty deeds were a change of
the grantees from the Clarks and Titensors to the plain-
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tiffs and a change of one legal description to include the
80 acres which had been inadvertently omitted. The
deeds were drafted, executed and deposited with the
escrow on or about December 8, 1960 (R. 422-442).
On or about November 20, 1963, the plaintiffs
wanted to borrow $75,000.00 from Travelers Insurance
Company. They proposed to secure the loan with a
mortgage on the real property they were purchasing
from defendants (Ex. D-8; R. 339). The Travelers
committed itself to loan $75,000.00 to plaintiffs on certain conditions which included that plaintiffs had good
record title to the real property, that plaintiffs procure
title insurance and that plaintiffs furnish an opinion
setting forth the mineral interests in the real property
(Ex. D-8; R. 339).
The plaintiffs negotiated with defendants for a
discounted payoff of the balance owing defendants (R.
344-345). The plaintiffs also retained Security Title
Company to cause record title in plaintiffs' names, to
issue title insurance and to give an opinion setting forth
the mineral interests in the real property according to
the conditions in Traveler's letter of committment to
loan which is Ex. D-8 (R. 343-344, 352-353, 360-363,
368, 390).
The defendants had instructed the escrow concerning the orally agreed discounted payoff and signed and
delivered the release of escrow (Ex. D-14) to the bank
which filed the correspondence and release in Exhibit
D-7 (R. 344-345).
8
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Sometime before and on or about February 26,
1964, plaintiffs were contacted by a representative of
Security Title Company for the purpose of causing
record title in their names and complying with the conditions for the $75,000.00 loan from Travelers (R. 353,
360-363). The title company's representative, Mr. Anderson, visited plaintiffs at their home and plaintiffs
signed the mortgage (Ex. D-10) which included an assignment of all rents and royalties from mineral interests (R. 350-351). Plaintiffs knew from past experience that mineral interests were involved and plaintiffs
knew that Mr. Anderson was going to perfect record
title in their name and obtain deeds to the defendants'
property and record them (R. 352-353, 356, 360-363).
Mr. McConkie who knew about the escrow file at First
Security Bank signed the release of escrow (Ex. D-14)
on February 26, 1964, in order that there would be delivery of the warranty deeds in escrow and in order that
they would be recorded in the County Recorder's office
(R. 381).
After plaintiffs were visited by Mr. Anderson at
their home, he called from the offices of the escrow,
First Security Bank. H e advised plaintiffs that there
was a problem with the title. Mr. McConkie went to the
bank and may have signed the release of escrow releasing the deeds in its offices (R. 381). While he was at
the offices of the escrow he additionally had conferences
with officers of the bank and Mr. Anderson concerning
the title. A major problem at that time was a stray deed.
Mr. Anderson and Mr. McConkie went to Mr. Earl

9
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Dillman's office for the purpose of correcting the title
problem to the satisfaction of Security Title. Mr. Dillman, Mr. McConkie and Mr. Anderson had a discussion
concerning the title and Mr. Dillman caused a correction of the stray deed. On that same day, the warranty
deeds containing the reservation of mineral interests
(Ex. P-2 and 3) were delivered and they, along with
the mortgage to Travelers, were recorded at the County
Recorder's office at the request of Security Title Company. Mr. McConkie did not remember seeing the warranty deeds with a reservation of mineral interests
which he caused Security Title to record. At that time
Mr. McConkie was not concerned about mineral interests. His one concern was acquiring title in the defendants' farm and obtaining $75,000.00 from Travelers (R.
367-368).
Mr. McConkie paid Security Title for the title insurance, title opinion and other services that it rendered along with the recording fees it advanced (Ex.
D-11;R. 355-356).
After plaintiffs became vested with title to the defendants' farm on February 24, 1964, they gave a second mortgage to First Security Bank in January, 1966
(R. 357) and they conveyed the property in Section 32
to Mr. Roy Warren in 1967 (R. 357-359).
I n connection with the conveyance to Mr. Warren
in 1967 the defendants had to obtain a partial release
of mortgage from Travelers and plaintiffs had some
difficulty in negotiating it (R. 358-359). After convey10
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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ing to Warren, plaintiffs continued to cause considerable activity concerning the record title to the real property in Plaintiffs' Exhibit No. 2 which was attached
to their complaint (R. 320, 351).
After all of the title work and conveyancing of the
property in question by the plaintiffs during February,
1964, and after they exercised dominion over the property for approximately nine years under the recorded
deeds with reservations of mineral interests, plaintiffs
filed their complaint on November 30, 1972. (R. 1)

ARGUMENT
POINT I
NO FRAUD APPEARS IN THE RECORD
AND NONE W A S FOUND.
A review of the plaintiffs' statement of facts, defendants' statement of facts and the record clearly reveals that the trial court was crorect when it inormed
plaintiffs' counsel as follows:
" I don't think you've shown any fraud.
#

#

*

I don't think there would be any factual basis
that the court could find any fraud on the part of
any party to this action. (R. 396)"
The trial judge's observations were correct in view
of the decision by this court in Pace v. Parrish, 122 Utah
11
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141,247 P.2d 273 (1952). Defendants motion to dismiss
should have been granted.
POINT I I
T H E FACTS AND CIRCUMSTANCES E X I S T ING AT OR ABOUT T H E T I M E T H E DEEDS
W E R E RECORDED ON FEBRUARY 26, 1964,
INCLUDING T H E RECORDING W E R E
SUCH AS TO F U R N I S H F U L L OPPORTUNITY TO T H E P L A I N T I F F S FOR T H E DISCOVERY OF T H E MISTAKE, OR FRAUD, I F
ANY E X I S T E D AND T H E STATUTES OF
LIMITATION COMMENCED TO RUN AT
T H A T TIME BECAUSE P L A I N T I F F S KNEW
OR SHOULD HAVE KNOWN OF T H E RESERVATIONS. MORE T H A N E I G H T YEARS
HAVING E L A P S E D SINCE T H E STATUTES
COMMENCED RUNNING,
PLAINTIFFS'
ACTION IS NOW BARRED.
The statutes of limitation for a cause of action
based of an instrument in writing is six years, § 78-12-23,
Utah Code Annotated 1953 as amended. The statute
of limitation upon a contract or obligation not founded
upon an instrument in writing is four years, § 78-12-25,
Utah Code Annotated 1953, as amended. The statute
of limitation for injury to real property or for an action
for relief on the ground of fraud or mistake is three
years, § 78-12-26, Utah Code Annotated 1953, as
amended.
12
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If a written contract in the case at bar was
breached it was breached on the date the deeds were
delivered and recorded on February 26, 1964, at 11:12
a.m. If the contract were a written or oral contract the
breach occurred at the same time. If any fraud occurred
it occurred at the same time.
Plaintiffs did not file their complaint until eight
years and nine months after the breach of contract or
fraud occurred. The only statute of limitation which
did not unequivocally run is the limitation concerning
actions based on mistake or fraud. That statute of limitation of three years commenced to run when the fraud
or mistake was discovered or should have been discovered.
Prior to plaintiffs becoming the assignee of the
Clarks and Titensors they were familiar with the use
of First Security Bank as an escrow in real estate transactions. Mr. McConkie discussed the escrow with Mr.
Clark and with the officers of First Security Bank, the
escrow. H e knew the escrow file was at the bank. H e
knew the escrow would deliver the deeds upon payment
of the balance owing on the contract and he knew the
deeds were probably within the escrow's file. H e executed a written assignment as assignee of the Clarks'
and Titensors' interest. As assignee of their interest
he and the defendants continued with the same escrow.
When he negotiated a discounted payoff of the balance
owing on the contract he retained Security Title to issue
insurance, to give a separate opinion concerning mineral interests, and to cause title of record in his name.
H e had the documents concerning the title exposed to

13
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him at his home when Mr. Anderson of Security Title
visited him. H e went to the bank and signed a release
of escrow on February 26, 1964, as assignee of the
March 19, 1959, contract. H e discussed the title with
the officers of the bank and Mr. Anderson. H e then
discussed the title with Mr. Earl Dillman, an attorney
at Roosevelt, Utah. H e wanted the title to be cleared
in order that he could deliver a mortgage satisfactory
to Travelers and obtain $75,000.00. Further, the plaintiffs knew that Security Title would record the deeds
and that they would probably be mailed to him. On
February 26, 1964, the deeds (Ex. P-2 and 3) were
recorded at the request of Security Title along with
the plaintiffs' mortgage to Travelers Insurance Company. The plaintiffs received $75,000.00 from Travelers Insurance Company and they paid Security Title
Company for their services, title insurance and opinion,
and for the recording fees Security Title had paid. No
one prevented the plaintiffs from reading the deeds
which were probably present and exposed to them during all of the activity concerning the title to the property prior to the recording of the deeds. Certainly, the
plaintiffs had every opportunity to examine the deeds
prior to delivery, at the time of delivery, at the time they
were recorded and since they were recorded on February 26,1964.
Utah decisions clearly demonstrate that the plaintiffs had knowledge of the reservation of mineral interests in the warranty deeds (Ex. P-2 and 3) at the
time the deeds were recorded and that said knowledge
14
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started the running of the three year statute of limitations for actions based on fraud. In McKellar v. McKellar, 23 Utah 2d 106, 48 P.2d 867 (1969) plaintiffs
initiated an action to cancel a warranty deed executed
in 1947 and duly recorded on the grounds of mistake.
Plaintiffs filed their action in 1968. The trial court
entered summary judgment upon defendant's motion
and this court affirmed the summary judgment. One
of this court's grounds for affirming the summary
judgment was that the plaintiffs had constructive notice
of the deed by operation of § 57-1-6 Utah Code Annotated 1953 and § 57-3-2 Utah Code Annotated 1953
which provides:
* 'Every conveyance . . . shall, from the time of
filing the same with the recorder of record, impart notice to all persons of the contents thereof;
In McKellar v. McKellar, supra, the court cited
Smith v. Edwards, 81 Utah 244, 17 P.2d 264 (1932).
I n that case plaintiff sought an action to set aside conveyances as defrauding creditors. This court reversed
the trial court and held that the action was barred
under the three year statute of limitations for the reason that discovery of the conveyances was made, or
the situation was such as to furnish full opportunity
for the discovery of fraud, if any existed, more than
three years before the action was filed. In reaching that
conclusion, this court construed the three year statute
of limitation and the recording statute. This court said :
"Under the statute from the time of filing the
conveyance with the recorder it shall impart no15
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tice to all persons of the contents thereof. From
the time of recording these conveyances all persons, including plaintiffs, notice was imparted to
them that the conveyances contained the statements above quoted. That the plaintiffs and all
other persons had notice that such conveyances
had been made and recorded seems to go without
saying, for surely, if one is charged with notice of
the contents, he must be charged with notice of
the existence of the document itself. . . .
I n this case the contents of the conveyances were
of record and imparted notice of the contents
and what the consideration was as shown thereby
and all persons might be expected to inquire
forthwith of what the 'other valuable considerations' consisted, if the truthfulness was doubted
and failing to do so would cause the statute to
run from the time when a reasonably prudent
person would have acted and thereby discovered
falsity if it existed.
#

#

#

#

. . . Unless the notice referred to in Comp. Laws
Utah 1917, § 4900, means what it says then one is
left to trace out from the uncertainties of human
activities, memories, and conflicting interests
what the facts were. Evidently the statute was
intended to constitute notice of the contents of
the recorded document, without reference to
place of residence or otherwise.
Under Comp. Laws Utah 1917, § 6468, the provision is clear that the limitation does not begin
to run until the facts constituting the fraud are
discovered. There is therefore a great deal said
in the cases about what amounts to discovery.
#

#

#

#
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The language of the Utah statute, Comp. Laws
Utah 1917, § 6468, subd. 4 upon the provision referring to 'discovery/ contains the following language: 'The cause of action in such case not to be
deemed to have accrued until the discovery by
the aggrieved party of the facts constituting the
fraud or mistake.'
The evidence discloses: The deeds were made
and recorded in December, 1920. The deeds contained, among other things, the statement 'for
one dollar and other good and valuable considerations.' A t least one of the deeds contained an
agreement to asume and pay two mortgages
against the property conveyed in the sum of
$1,000 each. There was a change of possession
within about six months after the conveyances.
The property was mortgaged by the grantees.
All of this information could have been obtained
readily upon inquiry. No inquiry of any nature
seems to have been made. . . .
W e are of the opinion that the action is barred
under the statute of limitations for the reason
that discovery was made, or the situation was
such as to furnish full opportunity for the discovery of fraud, if any existed, more than three
years before the bringing of the action. . . . "
All of the authorities, even those cited by plaintiffs,
compel the conclusion that the circumstances in the
case at bar were such that the plaintiffs knew or should
have known of the reservation of mineral interests in
the deeds (Ex. P-2 and3) at the time the deeds were
recorded. Furthermore, if they did not know it then
they undoubtedly knew it when they had all of the sub17
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sequent title work done in connection with the real
property described in those deeds, including the actual
conveyance of part of the property to Mr. Warren in
1967, five years before they filed their complaint.
Plaintiffs' attempt to bring themselves under decisions which cover persons vested with title in land for
a considerable period of time is not relevant to the case
at bar. The decisions cited by plaintiff support defendants' position in connection with the knowledge of
fraud required to start the statute of limitations running on February 26, 1964. U p until that time the
plaintiffs in the case at bar were not vested with title.
Prior to February 26, 1964, the plaintiffs in the case
at bar were only purchasers of land under an executory
contract to convey when the conditions of the contract
were performed. I n other words, even under plaintiffs'
authorities the statute of limitations for fraud commenced to run under the circumstances of the case at
bar when the deeds in issue were recorded on February
26,1964.
POINT III
ANOTHER CONTENTION THAT SUPPORTS
T H E J U D G M E N T OF T H E T R I A L COURT
IS THAT T H E PRIOR AGREEMENTS OF
T H E P A R T I E S MERGED IN T H E WARRANTY DEEDS W I T H T H E RESERVATIONS OF MINERAL INTERESTS EVEN
T H O U G H T H E D E E D S CONTAIN PROVISIONS W H I C H A R E A L L E G E D L Y INCON18
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SISTENT W I T H T H E PROVISIONS OF T H E
PRIOR AGREEMENTS. T H E D E E D S SUPERSEDE THE AGREEMENTS.
The warranty deeds which were delivered to the
defendants superseded all prior contracts of sale even
though said contracts may have been inconsistent with
the deeds. All of the prior contracts are deemed to
have been merged in the deeds under the circumstances
of this case. In this case there were prior written agreements concerning the sale of the real property under
which the purchasers made payment in full according
to the oral agreement of the amount of the unpaid
balance and the seller delivered the deeds to the purchasers who remained in possession under those deeds
for approximately nine years before complaining about
the reservations of mineral interests in the deeds. During that period the plaintiffs caused the deeds to have
been recorded, mortgaged the property as owners, purchased title insurance, farmed the property, paid taxes,
probably inspected the deeds during all the times they
were available to them after recording and did all other
acts of dominion over the real property as though they
were the owners under the deeds reserving the mineral
interests in the defendants. Clearly, the plaintiffs accepted delivery of the deeds which caused all prior negotiations and agreements to merge into them and supersede them. The application of the doctrine of merger
is further warranted and compelled by estoppel and
latches. Plaintiffs are estopped or prohibited from
claiming fraud or mistake because of latches. See
19
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Herminghausen v. Pierce (Okla.) 104 P.2d 252
(1940); Knight v. Southern Pacific Co., 52 Utah 42,
172 Pac. 689 (1918); Reese Howell Co. v. Brown, 48
Utah 141, 158 Pac. 684 (1916); Savings § Trust Co.
v. Stout, 36 Utah 206, 102 Pac. 865 (1909); Percifield
v. Rosa (Colo.) 220 P.2d 546 (1950); Schillinger v.
Huber (Mont.) 320 P.2d 346 (1958); Eisenberg v.
Goldstein (111.) 195 N.E.2d 184 (1964); and Powell
v.Esary (Wash.) 224 P.2d 323 (1950).

CONCLUSION
The judgment of the District Court should be
affirmed.
Respectfully submitted,
RAY, Q U I N N E Y & N E B E K E R
L. Ridd Larson
Attorneys for Defendant-Respondent
400 Deseret Building
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
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